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A busca pela compreensão de si mesma é um dos propósitos mais antigos da humanidade. Em boa parte das investigações sobre o assunto, entende-se que os seres são constituídos de cognição, emoções e ações em constante interação. Embora possuam semelhanças, as abordagens propostas apresentam inconsistências, divergindo, por exemplo, na natureza das interconexões ou nos portadores destes elementos. Muitas perspectivas consideram unicamente os humanos como detentores da cognição e emoção, enquanto outras entendem que animais não humanos ou sistemas como robôs poderiam, de um modo ou de outro, possuir cognição, emoções e, assim, de alguma forma, ser considerados agentes morais. Este livro reúne contribuições de diversas áreas e perspectivas referentes ao estudo da cognição, emoção e ação e das conexões entre elas. Os seus capítulos foram agrupados em três partes, de acordo com a predominância de seu conteúdo: história da filosofia; ciências cognitivas; ciências humanas e sociais. Há, ainda, uma entrevista com o Prof. Lauro F. B. da Silveira, a quem este livro é dedicado.

Philosophy of mind

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In this highly accessible book, a distinguished philosopher says current focus on the brain conceals the real powers of the mind. Edward Pols revisits one of the basic topics of philosophy: what is the distinction between mind and body and what is the relation between them? He disagrees fundamentally with the many contemporary philosophers who concentrate on the findings of neurophysiology and cognitive science and so look only to the brain for the causes and explanation of mind. Pols concedes the importance of such scientific studies but maintains that they focus on the infrastructure of mind and ignore the momentous difference between the infrastructure and mind itself.Pols calls upon the reader to attend to mind itself as a concrete and experientially available reality. This kind of attention, he argues persuasively, reveals mind to be at once causally dependent on the brain and causally effective on the physical processes of the brain and the world. Pols also examines the hierarchical view of mind and causality first proposed by Plato and Aristotle, the supersession of that view by the received scientific doctrine of causality, and the mistaken denial of the power of the mind to know an independent reality-a denial that resulted from the philosophical doctrines about knowing developed in the era that began with Descartes and ended with Kant.

Causation. --- Philosophy of mind.

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Larry M. Jorgensen provides a systematic reappraisal of Leibniz's philosophy of mind, revealing the full metaphysical background that allowed Leibniz to see farther than most of his contemporaries. In recent philosophy much effort has been put into discovering a naturalized theory of mind. Leibniz's efforts to reach a similar goal three hundred years earlier offer a critical stance from which we can assess our own theories. But while the goals might be similar, the content of Leibniz's theory significantly diverges from that of today's thought. Perhaps surprisingly, Leibniz's theological commitments yielded a thoroughgoing naturalizing methodology: the properties of an object are explicable in terms of the object's nature. Larry M. Jorgensen shows how this methodology led Leibniz to a fully natural theory of mind.

Philosophy of mind. --- Consciousness. --- Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm,

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Professor Rubinoff argues that Collingwood's later thought is a dialectical outcome of his early thought, and that the rapprochement between the various forms of knowledge. He thus provides a new conceptual framework which views the whole of Collingwood's system.

Philosophy of mind --- History. --- Collingwood, R. G.

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This book introduces concepts in philosophy of mind and neurophilosophy. Inside, three scholars offer approaches to the problems of identity, consciousness, and the mind. In the process, they open new vistas for thought and raise fresh controversies to some of the oldest problems in philosophy. The first chapter focuses on the identity problem. The author employs an explanatory model he christened sense-phenomenalism to defend the thesis that personal identity is something or a phenomenon that pertains to the observable/perceptible aspect of the human person. The next chapter explores the problem of consciousness. It deploys the new concept equiphenomenalism as a model to show that mental properties are not by-products but necessary products of consciousness. Herein, the notion of qualia is a fundamental and necessary product that must be experienced simultaneously with neural activities for consciousness to be possible. The last chapter addresses the mind/body problem. It adopts the new concept proto-phenomenalism as an alternative explanatory model. This model eliminates the idea of a mind. As such, it approaches the mind-body problem from a materialistic point of view with many implications such as, the meaning(lessness) of our existence, the possibility of thought engineering as well as religious implications.

Philosophy of mind. --- Mind, Philosophy of --- Mind, Theory of --- Theory of mind --- Philosophy --- Cognitive science --- Metaphysics --- Philosophical anthropology --- Metaphysics. --- Philosophy of Mind. --- God --- Ontology --- Philosophy of mind